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Abstract 
The paper presents a general equilibrium model of endogenous growth and trade 
between two countries, an advanced country (A) and a backward country (B). The 
development stage is summarized by the level of knowledge stock accumulated through 
R&D investments. Producers of intermediate goods, operating under increasing returns to 
scale and monopolistic competition, perform R&D investments to obtain process innovations 
(reduction of production costs) if they are incumbents, or product innovations if they are new 
entrants. The model shows that convergence in long-run growth rates can be obtained even 
in the absence of international technology spillover, in which case, under the assumption of 
no variety overlap, the gain from trade will be only static. Dynamic effects will be delivered 
instead in the presence of an initial overlap in the varieties produced in the two countries, 
together with a wide gap in unit production costs. In this case it is shown that the impact of 
trade liberalization on firms’ profits could generate a cumulative causation process which 
may lead to a polarization of innovative productions in the advanced country.   
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* Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department. E-mail: daniela.marconi@bancaditalia.it. 1 Introduction
International trade is one of the major forces driving the allocation of resources
within and between countries. Comparative and absolute advantages have static
and dynamic eﬀects on output levels and growth rates, as well as relevant welfare
implications. In the recent theoretical literature, the eﬀects of trade on growth
have been addressed in many frameworks, leading to somewhat opposite results.
The present work concentrates on models of endogenous growth. Within this
class of models, international trade liberalization has very diﬀerent implications
depending on whether or not technological progress spills over internationally.
In models where symmetric countries are considered, i.e. countries of the
same size and technological level (as in Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) and
Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Peretto (2000)), trade liberalization is usu-
ally beneﬁcial in terms of level. Given the symmetry assumption, countries grow
at an equal rate before and after trade liberalization and, since long-run growth
ultimately depends on market size, perfect international diﬀusion of technology
guarantees that the common rate of growth prevailing after trade integration
will be higher.1
Under the hypothesis of asymmetric countries, instead, the eﬀects of trade
liberalization are somewhat more controversial and again the results depend
crucially on the scope of technological spillover. If technological knowledge does
not spill over, initial conditions play a major role: diﬀerences across countries
can lead to large diﬀerences in income levels and divergence in the growth rates
(Young (1991), Matsuyama(1991), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Feenstra
(1996), Redding (1999)). Young (1991), for example, using a learning-by-doing
technology, shows that trade might be beneﬁcial in static terms, while it might
be harmful or have no eﬀects on backward countries’ growth rates. Redding
(1999) argues that in the presence of learning by doing the protection of infant
industries with large technological learning potential might be a welfare im-
proving strategy in the long run if it helps to close the gap with the technolog-
ical leader and reverse the comparative disadvantage. Gossman and Helpman
(1991), using a variety expanding model, show that, in the absence of inter-
national knowledge spillover, a possible outcome is the concentration of R&D
activities in the technological leader countries, with ambiguous welfare eﬀects
on the backward ones.
Models predicting convergence of growth rates across countries rely upon
the assumption of global knowledge spillover; for example, the North-South
**I thank Pietro Peretto and Jose Wynne for comments and discussions on earlier drafts of
this paper and two anonymous referee for useful comments and suggestions. All remaining
errors are my own responsibility. The views expressed are the author’s only and do not
necessarily reﬂect those of the Bank of Italy.
1In the traditional variety expanding and quality ladder models (Rivera-Batiz and Romer
(1991) and Grossman Helpman (1991)) the long run growth rate is proportional to the size of
the population; this result is called scale eﬀect. In more recent models (Peretto and Smulders
(2002)) the long run growth rate does not depend on the scale of the economy, while the size
of the market pins down the long-run equilibrium number of ﬁrms and varieties. For a stylized
description of the diﬀerent solutions to eliminate scale eﬀects see Jones (1998).
3trade literature assumes that southern backward countries have the ability to
imitate some of the goods initially invented in the North, the South accumulates
knowledge and learns by looking at what the North is producing. Comparative
(and absolute) advantages lead the South to produce and sell the imitated goods
on the world market. Trade by itself will not be enough to generate convergence,
unless it represents the very channel through which backward countries learn to
imitate (Grossman and Helpman (1991), van de Klundert and Smulders (1996),
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), Connolly (1999), Martin and Ottaviano (1999)).
The aim of this paper is to extend the existing literature by proposing a
model that can produce both convergence and divergence in the growth rates
in the absence of international spillover.2 Under this basic assumption, the im-
plications of trade liberalization between asymmetric countries will be further
analyzed introducing two novelties: ﬁrst, scale eﬀects will be eliminated, that
is the long-run growth rate will not depend on the size of the population of the
economy; and second, the possibility of variety overlaps between the two coun-
tries at the moment of trade liberalization will be explicitly considered. This
possibility is generally ruled out by assumption, while here I investigate its con-
sequences when unit costs in production are diﬀerent. These two modiﬁcations
which, to my knowledge, have never been introduced together in an endogenous
growth model with trade between asymmetric countries, are able to deliver new
and interesting outcomes. A ﬁrst result is that, when we impose balanced trade
and no production overlaps, the only way in which the two countries can reach
a long-run equilibrium with positive production in the innovative sector is when
they end up growing at the same rate. This, in turn, implies that if the two
countries were already growing at the same rate before trade liberalization they
will continue to do so, and the only gain from trade will be static. When we
introduce the possibility of production overlaps and a wide gap in unit produc-
tion costs, if the backward country is a relatively small country, domestic ﬁrms’
proﬁts will be negatively aﬀected while foreign ﬁrms’ proﬁts will increase. Un-
der these assumptions, a cumulative causation process might be generated and
the advanced country’s market share will expand, while that of the backward
country will shrink.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the theoretical
framework, develops the model under the assumption that only the ﬁnal good
is internationally traded, and describes consumer preferences, ﬁrms’ technol-
ogy, resource constraints, market clearing conditions, the steady state and the
dynamics of the model. Section 2.3 extends the model to the case in which in-
termediate goods are also traded and analyzes the eﬀects under several possible
initial conditions and variety overlap. Section 3 concludes. Two mathematical
appendices are added in two ﬁnal sections (A and B).
2Empirical studies on whether spillovers are national or international in scope have pro-
duced mixed results; for a comprehensive survey see Keller (2002).
42 The theoretical framework
The goal here is to construct a model of endogenous growth driven by knowl-
edge accumulation and increasing returns to scale. The development stage of a
country is summarized by the level of knowledge capital accumulated, which, in
turn, aﬀects the productivity of the entire economy. Research and development
(R&D) is performed in-house by proﬁt-seeking ﬁrms and generates economy-
wide externalities in the form of general purpose public knowledge that in-
creases the total factor productivity (TFP) of the entire economy. We consider
two countries, a backward country (B) and a more advanced country (A), with
three production sectors, the ﬁnal good sector, the intermediate goods sector
and the R&D sector and two factors of production, labour and knowledge cap-
ital. The two countries diﬀer in size and research experience. The ﬁnal good
sector produces a traditional good with constant returns to scale. The inter-
mediate goods sector produces a set of diﬀerentiated goods under increasing
returns to scale and monopolistic competition. Each monopolistic ﬁrm already
in the market invests in R&D to accumulate knowledge capital. Knowledge
capital enters the production function of intermediate goods and, like a process
innovation, reduces the unit production cost; also, it generates spillovers in-
creasing the domestic stock of public knowledge, which, in turn, increases the
productivity of the entire economy. New entrants must pay an entry cost in or-
der to acquire the state of the art technology to produce and sell a new variety
of intermediate good. It is further assumed that knowledge does not spill over
internationally, and therefore knowledge accumulation in each country depends
only on domestic R&D investments.
Several authors have stressed the essential role of domestic R&D using the
concept of absorptive capacity. This concept was ﬁrst introduced by Cohen and
Levinthal (1989) and then extensively studied in the empirical literature. Being
involved in innovative activities creates the necessary ability to understand and
adopt new technologies even when invented elsewhere (see for example Kinoshita
(2000) and Keller (2002)). In this paper, domestic in-house R&D beneﬁts the
entire economy, thereby increasing the ability of the ﬁnal good sector to adopt
high-tech intermediates.3 If, for example, international trade, by decreasing the
proﬁtability of the domestic high-tech sector in the backward country, reduces
or eliminates the domestic R&D eﬀort, it would have a negative impact on the
TFP growth rate of the economy. If the necessary ﬂow of knowledge is not
indigenously created, the rate of growth of the economy is reduced.4
3In the existing theoretical literature, a concept similar to the absorptive capacity, some-
times called learning-to-learn, is generally introduced only in the intermediate goods sector
(see for example Connolly (1999)). Here, instead, as in Romer (1987), the productivity of the
ﬁnal good sector is also positively aﬀected by knowledge accumulation in the intermediate
goods sector.
4Ciccone and Matsuyama (1996), using a variety expansion model à la Grossman and
Helpman, show the possibility of a vicious circle when the lack of indigenous ﬂow of knowledge
force the ﬁnal good industry to adopt more primitive modes of production, thereby reducing
the incentive to start up new ﬁrms and to introduce new varieties of intermediate inputs.
5In the presence of production overlap and lack of competitiveness, in terms
of production costs, an economy might be trapped into a lower level of eco-
nomic development due to the loss of the necessary incentives to operate in the
high-tech sector. A polarization process might then be observed, in which high-
tech production and R&D activities would concentrate in the advanced country.
This outcome would not be very far from reality; in fact, data on R&D shows
that more than 80% of world R&D investments are performed in a few advanced
economies and only a few emerging countries devote a signiﬁcant amount to it
(Kumar (1997), Crispolti and Marconi (2005); UNCTAD (2006)). It is inter-
esting, therefore, to analyze the impact of trade on industry dynamics, that is,
market shares, entry-exit and R&D investments and try to understand what is
the role of initial conditions. Do we observe convergence or divergence? Where
do we converge/diverge to? The model that I propose shows that, with endoge-
nous long-run growth and no scale eﬀects, even without international spillovers,
when the two countries do not trade in intermediate goods it is possible that
they grow at the same rate; however, if they start with diﬀerent initial stock of
knowledge capital, they will not converge in per capita levels. In the absence of
trade, the scale of the economy will be relevant only to pin down the equilibrium
number of ﬁrms and the level of output, while the long-run rate of growth will
depend on exogenous parameters.5 6 When we allow for trade, two eﬀects will
come into the picture. On the one hand, each ﬁrm potentially enjoys a larger
market but, on the other hand, competition will be higher due to the presence
of more ﬁrms. Which of the two eﬀects will prevail depends on several factors.
It will be shown that, under certain conditions, if there is no overlap in the
variety produced in the two countries, the two eﬀects cancel out and the growth
rate will not be aﬀected. If there is overlap, then unit production costs become
relevant and trade can generate a poverty trap in the backward country.
Overall, the general set up is standard. The innovative sector is a simpliﬁed
version of that in Peretto (1998, 2000), and Peretto and Smulders (2002), al-
lowing for both product and process innovations; the contemporaneous presence
of a vertical dimension of innovation (process innovation) and of a horizontal
one (variety expansion) eliminates the scale eﬀect in the growth rate.7 Here,
as in general in this literature, the production of intermediate goods drives
the knowledge accumulation process that, in turn, drives output growth, while
agents have perfect foresight and markets clear.
5For a discussion on scale eﬀects see Bakus et al. (1992), Jones (1995, 1998), Dinopoulos
and Tompson (1999) and Peretto and Smulders (2002).
6Although the elasticity of substitution across diﬀerentiated goods is constant, the structure
of the model allows, as in Peretto (1998, 2000) and Peretto and Smulders (2002), to determine a
ﬁnite, long-run equilibrium number of ﬁrms, which corresponds to the number of diﬀerentiated
goods.
7Product innovations introduce new varieties of intermediate goods, leading to what is
called the horizontal expansion of the economy; process innovations, instead, reduce the cost
of producing existing varieties and can be assimilated to a vertical expansion.
62.1 The model
Firms There are 3 sectors: The ﬁnal good sector (Y ), the intermediate goods
sector (X) and the in-house R&D sector (H) and two production factors: labour
(L) and ﬁrm-speciﬁc stock of knowledge capital (H), which in turn determines
the economy-wide general purpose knowledge capital, K. Nations produce in
each sector with the same production function, but have diﬀerent levels of H
and L. In particular, I assume that B’s initial stock of ﬁrm speciﬁc, and hence
general purpose, knowledge is below A’s. There are no international knowledge
spillovers and labour and ﬁnancial capital are mobile across sectors but not
across countries. Countries are denoted with i = A,B; ﬁrms with j = 1,2,...,N;
at each moment in time the total number of active ﬁrms in the world is given
by the sum of those producing in country A (NA) and in country B (NB),
NW = NA + NB.
Final good sector The Y sector produces a freely traded ﬁnal good under
perfect competition using labour and the whole range of intermediate goods
available in the market at each moment (N). Each intermediate good, xij, enters
the production symmetrically with a constant elasticity of substitution α.8 Also,
I assume that the general purpose knowledge of the economy increases the ability
of this sector to adopt the technology embodied in the intermediate inputs,














i = A,B, 0 < α < 1, 0 < ϕ < 1, α + ϕ < 1, j = 1,2,...,N
Intermediate goods sector and corporate R&D Intermediate goods are
produced combining labour and ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge with a constant returns
to scale technology with respect to each input (hence overall increasing returns
to scale). Each intermediate good producer is a local monopolist; for simplicity,
I assume monopolistic competition à la Chamberlin:9
xij = HjiLxij (2)
8The derivation of the Dixit-Stiglitz demand curves for the diﬀerentiated goods used as
inputs in a ﬁnal good production function has been formulated by Ethier (1982).
9When ﬁrms compete à la Chamberlin, they act as if each ﬁrm holds a negligible share
of the market. This behaviour is plausible when N is large enough, and I assume that this
is the case. Monopoly power derives from the existence of ﬁxed production costs, whereas
monopolistic competition is the outcome of the free-entry assumption (see also Tirole (1988)).
7where Hij is the ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge that determines the labour productivity
in the intermediate goods sector.10 labour productivity, in the intermediate
goods sector, can beimproved by employing labour in R&D projects as described
by the following production function:
•
Hij = βKiLHij (3)
where β is a productivity parameter, LHij is the amount of labour that ﬁrm j
in country i employs in R&D and Ki is the domestic stock of general purpose
knowledge. I assume that this stock is simply given by the arithmetic average





Each individual ﬁrm takes Ki as given without internalizing its contribution
to it. This means that while ﬁrms are producing product-speciﬁc knowledge,
completely appropriated, to some extent they also produce general purpose
knowledge, which takes the form of a public good.11 Devoting more workers to
R&D leads to higher rate of production of new knowledge. The larger the total
stock of knowledge, Ki, the higher the productivity of workers.12 Constant re-
turns to scale with respect to knowledge capital in the R&D production function
ensures endogenous growth. To simplify the analysis, we shall assume that ﬁrms









In addition to labour costs for production and R&D, I assume that ﬁrms have
to incur a ﬁxed, overhead labour requirement f.13
10As pointed out by van de Klundert and Smulders (1995), if we measure xij in quality
units, both forms of innovations, process innovation and quality innovation, can be expressed
as an increase in Hij.
11As in Romer (1990), R&D output is, in part, a non rival good, partially excludable and
privately provided. Inputs like labor and the specialized intermediate inputs are rivalrous, that
is they can be used only in one sector at time. In contrast, the general purpose knowledge
capital, K, is non-rival, it can be used in all sectors at the same time. We could also impose
that the ability to exploit outside knowledge depends on the ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge stock, in
this case we could modify equation (3) introducing Hij among the production factors.
12As already noted, the accumulation of knowledge increases the TFP of the ﬁnal sector as
well, but the R&D sector does not internalize this contribution.
13This ﬁxed labor cost can capture costs of management and coordination as in van de
Klundert and Smulders (1995).
8Entrants For simplicity I assume that entrants enter the market with the
same level of technology as incumbents in the country and, once they have
entered the market, beneﬁt from the same technological spillover.14 Each new
ﬁrm introduces a new variety of intermediate good. In order to start up a
new ﬁrm entrants must acquire the state-of-the-art initial stock of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
knowledge, which is a sunk cost. I assume that the entry cost, measured in
labour units, is ﬁxed and equal to Ψwi.15 Entrants will enter the market if the
value of the ﬁrm (given by the present discounted value of the ﬂow of proﬁts)
is at least equal to the sunk cost, that is: Vij ≤ Ψwi and
 
N ≥ 0 with at least
one equality.
Consumers To close the model we need to specify the consumers behav-






where C is consumption of the homogeneous and freely traded ﬁnal good,
which is also the numeraire good, and ρ is the rate of time preference.
Households in each country maximize their utility subject to a budget con-
straint stating that the present discounted value of expenditure cannot exceed











r(τ−t)[W(τ) + D(τ)]dτ (7)
14Here entrants contribute to the average stock of knowledge and each ﬁrm beneﬁts from it
in a symmetric way. In Peretto and Smulders (2002), instead, it is assumed that the intensity
of technological spillover is inversely related to the technological distance between ﬁrms.
15As will be proven later, in order to have positive long run growth of knowledge capital, the
sunk cost faced by an entrant must be higher than the cost of producing a unit of knowledge




; therefore, in order to acquire Hi units of knowledge capital an entrant must




It would be interesting to specify the entry cost as an increasing function of the ratio
between the ﬁrm speciﬁc knowledge that entrants must acquire and the domestic stock of





, with Ψ′ ( ) > 0 and Ψ(0) = 0.
However, since here, as will be speciﬁed later, ﬁrms are assumed to be symmetric within a
country but not across countries, we need to specify at which technological level ﬁrms choose
to enter once they compete on the international market and knowledge capital can be bought
abroad. At this stage I disregard this further complication, but it is certainly one interesting
extension of the model to be explored.




r(τ − t) = 1
τ−t
  τ
t r(s)ds is the average real interest rate. At time t
households own the existing ﬁrms producing ﬁnal and intermediate goods and
the net revenues are paid to them as dividends. Final goods ﬁrms earn zero
proﬁts and own no assets and can thereforebe ignored in the speciﬁcation of
endowment.




= ri −ρ, i = A,B. (8)
Equation (8) implies that, at each moment in time, the rate of growth of
consumption is equal to the diﬀerence between the instantaneous interest rate
and the rate of time preference.
2.2 Equilibrium without intermediate goods trade
First we analyze the properties of the model when only ﬁnal consumption goods
are traded, while intermediate goods are not. This assumption allows us to set
a common numeraire between the two countries and at the same time, by the
balanced trade assumption, to obtain an equilibrium that is directly comparable
to an autarchic one. In fact, in this case, each country produces its ﬁnal good
using only the domestic intermediate inputs.
Given the symmetry across domestic ﬁrms and the constant elasticity of
substitution, the ﬁnal good sector in country i will employ the same quantity







Equation (9) implies that ﬁnal good production exhibits constant returns to
scale in labour, Lyi, and the total amount of intermediate inputs employed in
production, Nixi. Overall, there are increasing returns to scale due to knowledge
spillover, captured by the term K
ϕ




Proﬁt maximization and perfect competition imply that labour will be em-
ployed up to the level at which its marginal productivity equals the wage rate
and that each variety of intermediate good will be employed up to the level at









17Note that, since I am ruling out by assumption international knowledge spillovers, only
the domestic stock of knowledge, Ki , aﬀects the domestic TFP.





Equation (11) is the inverse demand function for the jth variety of intermediate
input in country i, which can also be expressed as the direct demand function
in the well-known Dixit-Stiglitz form,






















is the elasticity of demand with respect to price, which in
turn depends on the degree of substitution between varieties (α). Equation (12)
is the downward sloping demand for each intermediate input j known to the
monopolistic ﬁrms.
Instantaneous proﬁts are given by πij = xijpij −[Lxij +LHij +f]wi; in each
country each ﬁrm j in the X-sector will maximize the present discounted value








subject to technology (2), (3) and demand (12). The current value Hamiltonian







xij − (LHij + f)wi + qijβKiLHij, (14)
where Hi is the state variable, pxij and LHij are the control variables and qij,the
costate variable, is the shadow value of the innovation. The maximization with
respect to pxij yields the optimal pricing rule of a constant mark-up over the
marginal cost,








Optimizing with respect to labour we get:
qijβKi = wi, (16)
which states that a ﬁrm is willing to invest in R&D up to the point at which
















Equation (17) states that the rate of return of an innovation, rR&D, which
is performed by incumbent ﬁrms, must be equal to the capital gain or loss
plus the net marginal increase of proﬁts due to the innovation. Deriving the










The equilibrium on the capital market requires LHij > 0 only if r = rR&D,




























The rate of return to R&D is an increasing function of ﬁrm size, expressed by the
number of workers employed in production, and of the rate of growth of wages
(the higher the rate of growth of wages, the more valuable is the reduction of
production costs provided by R&D investments); it is a decreasing function of
the number of ﬁrms and of the rate of growth of knowledge capital, because ﬁrms
do not internalize their contribution to the public knowledge capital (remember
that given (4), γKi = γHi).
Let us consider now the entry process of new ﬁrms. Let us assume that
entrants need to ﬁnance their entry cost by issuing equities. The return on






























12Also, as noted before, if the rate of entry is positive, then the value of the
ﬁrm must be equal to the sunk entry cost, i.e. V = Ψwi; substituting this




















The rate of return to entry is negatively related to the sunk entry cost and to the
incumbency costs (the in-house R&D and ﬁxed costs), while, as for incumbents,
it is positively correlated with the size of the ﬁrm and the growth rate of wages.
In equilibrium, with positive entry and R&D, the rates of return of these
two activities must be equal. Since they are both a decreasing function of the
rate of growth of knowledge capital, if we plot the two rates in the ri-γHi space
(with r on the vertical axis), the existence of such an equilibrium requires that
the two functions intersect, and stability requires that above the intersection
point the return to R&D be higher than the return to invent a new good. The
reason is that only incumbents aﬀect γHi and therefore drive r and γHi towards
the equilibrium point, whereas entrants aﬀect r only by changing the number
of ﬁrms. The reverse must be true below the intersection point. Therefore,











the cost of a product innovation must be suﬃciently higher than the cost of
a process innovation (see note 15, p. 8).19 The intercept conditions require
that for γH = 0 the return to R&D for incumbents be higher than the return






f ( note that the
positivity of this expression requires α < 1
2; the plausibility of this assumption
will be discussed later on) and for r = 0 the intercept with the x-axis for entrants





(1 − α) −αΨβ
f20.
Resource constraints and market clearing conditions Let us now deﬁne
the resource constraints and the market clearing conditions. The labour market
clearing condition is the following:
Lyi +NiLxi + Ni(LHi +f) +Ψ
•
Ni = Li (23)
Whereas the economy-wide budget constraint can be deﬁned as follows:
Ci + Ψwi
•
Ni = wiLi +Niπi (24)
19For a further discussion on the existence and stability of a Nash-equilibrium of this type
see Peretto and Smulders (2002).
20The slope condition and the vertical axis condition are suﬃcient to satisfy also the hori-








(1 − α) − αΨβ




13The worldwide market clearing condition for the consumption good can be spec-
iﬁed as follows:
CA +CB = CW = YA +YB = YW (25)
2.3 Transitional dynamics and steady state
The transitional dynamics and the long-run growth depends on the behaviour of
the intermediate goods sector, and speciﬁcally on the value of the monopolistic
ﬁrms and the entrants’ and incumbents’ behaviour. Two opposite forces are at
work. While the entry rate is a positive function of the value of the ﬁrm, the
increasing number of ﬁrms, by reducing the market share of each monopolist,
tends to reduce the value of the ﬁrm. The interaction between these two eﬀects
will determine the equilibrium path. In each country the system of equations



























































where in (29) ζ = 1−α+α2 and I made use of the fact that, since the wage
rate has to be the same in the ﬁnal and intermediate goods sector, combining
(10) and (12) and (15) together with the symmetry assumption, the constant







Before starting to analyzethesystemdynamics, let us characterize the steady
state. In order to ﬁnd the equilibrium number of ﬁrms and the long-run rate of
growth of the economy we need to analyze more closely the relationship between
these two variables. The ﬁrst thing to note is that is steady state
•
Ni = 0 and,
from the Euler equation, the rate of return must equal (28); also, since the labour








=γyi = (α +ϕ)γHi.
14Let us consider ﬁrst only the incumbents’ behaviour. Combining (26), (28),












where φ = 1 − α +2α2.












wi, equal to zero and
again using (29) and (5) we obtain another negative relationship between γHi
and Ni when ﬁrms make zero proﬁts:
(25)γZPA




The intersection between (31) and (32) gives Nmax
i , that is the number
of ﬁrms that will drive the incumbents’ proﬁts to zero (see Fig. 2). This
equilibrium will be stable only if the SSA curve is ﬂatter than the ZPA curve.
In fact, disregarding for a moment the entry cost, to the left of point Z, along the
SSA curve, proﬁts are positive and ﬁrms will tend to enter the market, whereas
to the right of Z, along the SSA curve, proﬁts are negative and ﬁrms will leave
the market. At point Z, γminA
Hi and NmaxA




ζ [αβf − (1 − α)ρ]




αβ[φ(1 −α) − α]
ζ(βf −ρ)
Li (34)
We can now ﬁnd the equilibrium with positive entry, when rE = rR&D = r.












































The steady-state number of ﬁrms with positive entry and R&D (N∗) is then



















αβf + [αβΨ− (1 −α)]ρ
(1 − 2α)
(39)
Let us consider (39). When Ψβ >
1 −α
α
, the free-entry equilibrium rate of
growth is positively related to the rate of time preference (ρ). In fact, in this case
the cost of process innovation is suﬃciently below the entry cost, and therefore
a higher rate of time preference will reduce the incentive to enter the market
more than the incentive to invest in R&D, so that the rate of growth of the stock
of knowledge increases. Moreover, the rate of growth is positively related to the
productivity of the R&D sector (β), to the elasticity of substitution between
diﬀerentiated intermediate goods (α), to the size of ﬁxed costs (f) and to the
sunk entry cost (Ψ). Turning to (38), in fact, we ﬁnd that higher values of β,
α, f, and Ψ, make entry less attractive, hence the equilibrium number of ﬁrms
declines. It is also worth noting that the number of ﬁrms is directly proportional
to the number of workers in the economy.
We may conclude that, in this model, as long as the two countries have the
same parameters, the steady-state rate of growth will be the same, whereas the
equilibrium number of ﬁrms will depend on the size of the economy.
We can now turn to analyze the system dynamics. The dynamics can be
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161. There is a unique free-entry steady state with positive growth and a positive
number of ﬁrms, N i=N ∗




2. There is a unique perfect foresight dynamic general equilibrium:
if N i<N∗
i, the economy jumps on the saddle path and converges over
time to the free-entry steady state;
if N ∗
i<N i<Nmax
i , the economy enters immediately a steady state with no
entry.
If Ni > Nmax
i , the economy jumps to the no-entry steady state corre-
sponding to N max
i .
Let us analyze the plausibility of the assumptions. α represents the share of
output that will be absorbed by the intermediate inputs as production factors.
If we consider the set of intermediate inputs as physical capital, then from the
standard Cobb-Douglas function estimates we generally obtain that this share
is less than 1/2, and therefore the necessary condition seems plausible. The
second restriction requires that the cost of improving on an existing good, 1/β,
is suﬃciently below the cost of introducing a new good, Ψ, which also seems a
plausible assumption.
The dynamics of the system is described in Fig.1. Along the VV locus
•
vi = 0
and along the NN locus
•
Ni = 021. There are tree diﬀerent regions in which the
behaviour of the system diﬀers. If the economy starts out with a number of
ﬁrms Ni(0) < N∗
i then it will jump on the saddle path and move along it until
it reaches the equilibrium E. After N∗
i is reached there is no more entry. If
N∗
i < Ni (0) < Nmax
i , then the economy will be in steady state at that point
along the VV locus. That is, the economy shows hysteresis because there is
asymmetry between incumbents and entrants. The presence of overhead ﬁxed
costs implies that there will be a maximum number of ﬁrms above which proﬁts
become negative. When the value of the ﬁrm lies below the sunk entry cost
(between E and Z on the VV locus) we would not observe entry. But, once in
themarket, a ﬁrm would not decide to exit unless proﬁts were negative. At Nmax
i
proﬁts are zero and above Nmax
i proﬁts are negative. Therefore, after Nmax
i we
are in the region where
•
Ni < 0. If the economy starts with Ni(0) > Nmax
i it
moves back to Z along the saddle path to the right of the Nmax
i region. Any
other trajectory can be ruled out because it violates either the economy resource
constraint or the rational expectation hypothesis.
The long-run growth rate of per capita output can derived taking the log
and time derivative of (9) and (2) and making use of the result that in steady
21Along the NN locus Vi = Ψwi = Ψ
Yi
Lyi
; therefore vi =
Ψ
Lyi
and Lyi = bLi, where b is a
constant parameter, hence vi =
c
Li








xi = (ϕ + α)γHi (42)
It is interesting to note that in the absence of international technology
spillover and intermediate goods trade the two economies can grow at the same
rate only if they both perform indigenous R&D. In this model, if a country does
not innovate, the only way to obtain positive long-run growth is by importing
a growing number of varieties; in fact, as shown in (9), increased specializa-
tion of intermediate inputs increases labour productivity; however, its growth
rate would always be lower than that of the innovating country: the growth
diﬀerential would be stable, whereas output levels would diverge.
2.4 Equilibrium with intermediate goods trade
In this section I extend the model allowing international trade of intermediate
goods. I need, therefore, to change some of the equations. First of all, when in-
termediate goods are traded, each producer sells at home and abroad, therefore
facing domestic and foreign competition. Let us assume for the moment that
there is no overlap between the intermediate goods produced in the two coun-
tries. Firms will be symmetric within a country and will diﬀer across countries
if their unit cost of production diﬀers. The total demand that each producer












Let us deﬁne sy ≡
YB
Yw










22The constant allocation of labor across sectors in the long run can be easily veriﬁed from










in the long run, γH is constant, N is constant, and therefore
•
N = 0, hence:
Ly =
1 − α




which is a constant as well, given the assumption of a constant labor force.
23If the labor force growth rate were positive (γL > 0), we would subtract αγL from the
expression.




being the price elasticity of demand for intermediate goods. Then,
the balance of trade equilibrium reads:
(YA −CA) + α(1 −sx)syYw = (YB −CB) +αsx(1 − sy)Yw (45)
Using the deﬁnitions of sy and sx and the market clearing conditions for
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In order to understand the dynamics of the system it is important to un-
derstand when and where it is possible to converge in the long run. We need,
therefore, to analyze how the rate of return to R&D and entry together with
the zero proﬁt condition change with free trade in both countries. To this end
I will use one of the results of the model stated in the following proposition:26
Proposition 2 If 0 < sx < 1 balanced trade implies sx = sy.
In steady state the number of ﬁrms must be constant in both countries and








= γyw = [sxϕ + (1 −sx)α]γHi + [(1 − sx)ϕ +sxα]γHj, (48)
Inserting these two conditions into (47) I can state the following proposition:
24See appendix B for the derivation.
25See appendix B for the derivation.
26The proof is reported in appendix B.
19Proposition 3 In the long run sx tends to a positive constant if and only
if the two countries grow at the same rate.
We know that in steady state, with positive R&D, rR&D = ρ + γy must
hold in both countries. By the same procedure we applied in the previous
section we can derive γSSFT
Hi , where FT means free trade. It is easy to verify
that under these conditions γSSFT
Hi = γSSA
Hi , which also implies that γFT∗
Hi =
γA∗
Hi. Moreover, since the zero proﬁt condition under free trade is equivalent
to that under autarchy, the free trade minimum rate of growth and maximum
number of ﬁrms will also be the same as under autarchy in both economies. We
can therefore conclude that when there is no production overlap, in order to
converge to a steady state in which both countries produce a positive amount of
intermediate goods and perform R&D they need to converge towards the same
long-run rate of growth.
As to the dynamics, it is easy to verify from equations (12) and (43) that
under the assumption of balanced trade and no variety overlap, since proposi-
tion 2 holds, intermediate goods ﬁrms face the same demand curve they faced in
autarchy. Therefore, we would not observe any transition dynamics. Nonethe-
less, allowing trade in intermediate goods would have a positive eﬀect on GDP
levels, in that the number of intermediate goods that it is possible to employ
in production would expand, the country that can access the greater number of
varieties compared with autarchy would experience the greatest jump in GDP
levels, but the two countries would never converge in levels.
If there is overlap in the range of intermediate goods produced by the two
countries, when they start trading, by the assumption of Bertrand’s competition
and the form of the demand function, only the lower-cost producer will survive.
If, due to the gap in ﬁrm-speciﬁc (and hence average) knowledge between the
two countries, the unit cost of intermediate goods is greater in B than in A;
then A’s ﬁrms producing in the same product lines as B’s ﬁrms can drive those
ﬁrms’ sales to zero. In order for this to happen, the knowledge gap must be high
enough.27 Combining (10) and (15) for the two countries, the unit cost will be








1 − α −ϕ
.
(49)
We can further assume that switching from a production line to another implies
the need to build ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge from the beginning; that is, once
production is shut down, the ﬁrm has to pay the sunk entry cost again. Once
trade is opened there is incentive for ﬁrms to specialize in diﬀerent designs.
Therefore, B ﬁrms will be forced to enter the production of new varieties. To
understand the consequences of shutting down some monopolistic ﬁrms we need
to check what is the eﬀect on incumbents’ proﬁts in the two countries. Let us
suppose that at the time of opening up to trade the number of ﬁrms changes































wi ≶ 0 (50)
The sign of equation (50) is not determined, but we can say that if country i is
big enough, that is if sxi > 1/2, proﬁts are negatively aﬀected by an increase
in the number of ﬁrms in the same country. When Ni increases, the market
share of each monopolistic ﬁrm decreases (negative eﬀect on proﬁts) but at the
same time the demand for labour increases, thereby increasing the domestic
wage rate and mark-up (positive eﬀect on proﬁts); moreover, when the number
of ﬁrms increases, the number of specialized inputs also increases, which in turn
increases the ﬁnal good sector TFP with a positive feedback on intermediate
input demand (positive eﬀect on proﬁts). The total eﬀect on proﬁts will depend
on the relative strength of these forces. The bigger is the country’s world market
share, the higher is the negative eﬀect coming from the increased competition.
As far as concerns the other country, we can say that proﬁts are negatively














This result allows us to conclude that, when there exist overlaps in production,
the backward country’s ﬁrms which have higher production costs must exit the
market. The impact on A’s ﬁrms’ proﬁts is positive; therefore, in this country
there will be incentive to enter new production lines. In B the eﬀect is uncertain.
If B is large enough, incumbents’ proﬁts will be positively aﬀected and ﬁrms
will enter new production lines; by contrast, if B is a small country, then proﬁts
might be negatively aﬀected and the incentive to enter will be reduced and, due
to the presence of ﬁxed costs, we might even observe other ﬁrms exiting the
market. A polarization eﬀect could emerge, and a cumulative causation process
could be generated. The pressure of new entrants in A will push wages up; in
the short run wages will grow at a higher rate and the return to R&D will also
be pushed up. Equation (47) implies that the market share of A will grow larger
and larger while the share of B will shrink. Still, if the variety overlap is not
complete, there will be a positive jump in GDP levels in both countries.
To summarize, I ﬁnd that in this model the relative size of a country is a
signiﬁcant feature in evaluating its ability to face increased international com-
petition because country size aﬀects the incentive that innovative ﬁrms face in
the global market. In the absence of technological spillovers, large countries can
adjust better than small countries to increased international competition.
213 Concluding remarks
This paper explores the consequences of trade liberalization between countries
at diﬀerent development levels and in the presence of increasing returns to scale
in a model of endogenous growth with two types of innovations: cost-reducing
innovation and product innovation. Here capital and labour are assumed to be
immobile across countries and technology spillovers are only national in scope.
A ﬁrst result that this framework, based on a stylized industrial organization
model, delivers is that when we impose balanced trade and no production over-
lap the only way in which the two countries can reach a long-run equilibrium
with positive production in the innovative sector is when they end up growing
at the same rate. This, in turn, implies that if the two countries were already
growing at the same rate before trade liberalization they will continue to do so
and the only gain from trade will be static. When we introduce the possibility
of production overlap and a wide gap in unit production costs, if the backward
country is a relatively small country, domestic ﬁrms’ proﬁts will be negatively
aﬀected, while foreign ﬁrms’ proﬁts increase. Under these assumptions, a cumu-
lative causation process might be generated and the advanced country’s market
share expands while that of the backward country shrinks.
Therefore, we have found that even within our framework, as in Grossman
Helpman (1991; chapter 8), country size matters in an open economy and yet
both frameworks seem too rigid, needing many restrictive assumptions in order
to get some kind of close-form solution that allows autarchy to be compared
with free trade. The assumptions of capital and labour immobility across coun-
tries are very restrictive and not very realistic; the usual full employment and
perfect mobility of labour across sectors are also highly unrealistic assumptions,
yet many of the results are driven by them in this literature of trade and en-
dogenous growth. As far as technology spillovers are concerned, by assuming
their national scope, I wanted here to stress the beneﬁcial role of indigenous
R&D eﬀort in the vertical dimension of innovation, that is the cost reduction
innovations performed by incumbents, while the role of horizontal innovations,
that is the variety expanding innovations introduced by new entrants, can and
will exploited through international trade liberalization. If process innovation
technological spillovers were international in scope, there would no longer be a
need to talk of backward and advanced countries, and the share of a country in
the world market would be simply determined by its size, which does not seem
a realistic outcome either.
As far as possible extensions are concerned, ﬁrst one could introduce labour
market segmentation and distinguish between skilled and unskilled workers,
with skilled workers employed in the R&D sector. In this case, the equilibrium
number of ﬁrms will not be a function of the entire work-force but of the skilled
workers employed in the economy. It would be also interesting to consider the
case in which skilled workers are mobile across countries.28 This would certainly
introduce a wage rigidity and cross-country resource reallocation that could be
28On this last feature, in particular, recent studies (see for example Carrington and De-
22interesting to explore in order to describe possible polarization processes of R&D
investments. The other important extension would be to drop the assumption
of balanced trade and consider international mobility of ﬁnancial capital. This
would certainly change dramatically the incentive to invest in one location or
the other. The speciﬁcation of entry costs could also be improved to let them
diﬀer once trade is opened and ﬁrms can choose the level of technology with
which to enter the market.
tragiache (1998); Docquier (2006); Bugamelli and Marconi (2006)) show that skilled workers
tend to be quite mobile world-wide and to show greater probability to emigrate compared with
unskilled workers. In relative terms, the outﬂow of highly educated individuals is particularly
signiﬁcant for the most backward countries, such as in Central America and Africa.
234 Appendix A: derivation of the dynamics with-
out trade
Equation (40) is derived from the arbitrage condition for entrants given by (20)
and under the assumption that ri = rR&D = rE.














From the ﬁnal good production function, the goods market clearing condition













































− γyi , then by setting









Substituting (A3) and (35) into (A4), (40) is obtained.
5 Appendix B: derivation of the dynamics with
trade
Equation (46) is derived from the labour market clearing condition (23) using:
the demand function that each domestic producer faces, given by equation (43),
the deﬁnition of sx, given by (44) , equation (10), which still holds when in-
termediate inputs are traded, and the fact that Yi, by deﬁnition, is equal to
syYw.




























































substituting (B2) into (B1) and dividing left-hand and right-hand side by sx
we get equation (47).
Proof of proposition 3.
To prove proposition 3 we use the balanced trade condition given by equation
(45) and the equilibrium condition given by equation (24). Combining those two
we get:
Yi−(wiLi+πijNi)+α(1−sy)Ywsx = Yj−(wjLj+πjjNj)+αsyYw(1−sx). (B3)
Let us consider the left-hand side of equation (B3). If we substitute in it the
expression for proﬁts and the labour market clearing condition we get:
Yi − (wiLi +πijNi) − wiΨ
•










wi + α(1 −sy)Ywsx.











Yi − (wiLi +πijNi) −wiΨ
•
Ni +α(1 − sy)Ywsx = (B5)
syYw − αsxYw − (1 −α)syYw +α(1 − sy)Ywsx = αsyYw − αsxsyYw
Plugging (B5) back into (B3) and using the fact that the right-hand side is
going to be symmetric to the left-hand side:
25αsy(1 −sx)Yw = α(1 −sy)sxYw (B6)
(B6) is satisﬁed if and only if sx = sy.
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